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The PLA's Capability Gap Is Real — But Treating It as Permanent Is the Analytical Error
9/16/2026
The argument has a seductive logic: China's military has documented shortcomings — limited combat experience, political interference in command culture, institutional dysfunction signaled by high-profile purges — therefore an invasion of Taiwan remains beyond reach. Adm. (ret.) D…
Recent posts
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