There's a particular kind of defense tech headline that sounds like a policy breakthrough and turns out to be a plumbing story. "Office of Strategic Capital expands dual-use lending" is the kind of phrase that makes investors sit up — government money flowing to startups that build civilian and military technology at once, without the strings of a traditional procurement contract. It's a real idea, and a sensible one. But this week's source material doesn't show that program in motion. What it shows is something more revealing: how capital actually moves into the industrial base right now, loan program or no loan program, and why the mechanisms we do have are showing stress at exactly the moment the Pentagon needs them to hold.
Start with the deal that actually happened. Raytheon selected Ursa Major and the American arm of Italy's Avio to jointly produce solid rocket motors for the Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile — a second supply source alongside Raytheon's existing production. Ursa Major, founded in 2015, is exactly the kind of company a dual-use lending program would want to back: a startup that's spent a decade building credibility as a military propulsion supplier. But the capital here isn't coming from a government loan desk. It's coming from RTX itself, which needs a second source because the Navy's Tomahawk demand has outgrown what one producer can deliver. RTX won a $22.9 billion multi-year deal in August to scale Tomahawk output to 1,000 rounds a year, and that scale requirement is what pulled Ursa Major into the supply chain — not a federal loan guarantee, but a prime's own balance-sheet math.
This is the pattern worth watching if you're trying to understand how capital actually reaches dual-use and startup suppliers today: it flows through prime contractors acting as de facto venture allocators, deciding which smaller firms get folded into billion-dollar production programs. A loan office can underwrite risk. It can't manufacture demand. The demand here came from the Navy running so low on inventory that Acting Navy Secretary Hung Cao testified the service has resorted to using expired copies of the missile in combat. That's the kind of pressure that moves money faster than any policy instrument.
Nobody Is Steering This Boat, and the GAO Just Said So in Writing
If you want to understand why a coherent capital strategy for the industrial base — loans, equity, prime contracts, whatever the instrument — keeps running into trouble, a new Government Accountability Office report gives you the mechanism. The GAO found that the Pentagon does not have an overarching plan that links munitions production and funding to actual requirements. Pentagon officials told investigators that absent such a plan, the department "can be reactive to global events rather than driven by total requirements."
That matters for any dual-use capital program, because a lending office can only be as smart as the requirements it's lending against. The report notes the Army's rush to boost 155mm howitzer shell production — complicated by a new Texas plant that cost nearly $500 million and failed to produce any shell components — wasn't driven by a calculated total requirement at all. It was driven by shortages from supporting allies. Even the inventory data itself is a mess: the Munitions Readiness Initiative pulls from 37 separate DoD data sources, and the acquisition office doesn't consistently reconcile that tool against what the individual services report.
Put a loan program on top of that and you haven't solved the capital problem — you've just added a new door into a building where nobody can tell you what's actually in the warehouse. The investor instinct here should be skepticism, not cynicism: a lending mechanism for dual-use startups is a good idea on paper, but its value depends entirely on whether the requirements behind it are real numbers or reactive guesses. Right now, by the GAO's own account, they're closer to the latter.
The Trust Problem Sits Above the Capital Problem
There's a second reason to be cautious about any capital-allocation story coming out of the Pentagon this month, and it has nothing to do with startups at all. Bloomberg reported that Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg steered companies negotiating multibillion-dollar weapons deals — including Lockheed Martin and RTX — toward his longtime Goldman Sachs banker, Jim Donovan, a dealmaker who worked with Feinberg for years at his former firm, Cerberus Capital Management. Both manufacturers reportedly hired Donovan.
I'd flag this not as a scandal play but as context for anyone evaluating how seriously to take new capital mechanisms emerging from this Pentagon. The official steering decisions about who finances what, who advises on what deal, and who gets access to which negotiating table are apparently porous enough that a sitting deputy secretary's personal banking relationships show up inside multibillion-dollar weapons negotiations. If that's how capital relationships move at the prime level, a startup counting on an arm's-length, merit-based loan evaluation from the same department should temper its expectations. Institutional trust is itself a kind of capital, and this story spends some of it.
The Money That Was Supposed to Fund All of This Just Evaporated
Even if the planning problem and the trust problem were solved tomorrow, there's a third constraint that swamps both: the money. The Trump administration built its fiscal 2027 defense posture around a $1.1 trillion base budget plus a $350 billion reconciliation package to cover the industrial-base buildout. That reconciliation bill is now dead. House Republicans told Axios the package is dead on arrival without accompanying spending cuts, and with just 16 days left in session before Democrats take control of the House in January, there isn't runway to negotiate a new deal. Senate Republicans haven't even committed to trying again.
This is the frame that should discipline any enthusiasm about a new lending vehicle for dual-use companies: a loan program is a mechanism, not a budget. If Congress can't appropriate the underlying dollars, the mechanism sits empty. The Pentagon's munitions-production ambitions — the same ones driving deals like Ursa Major's Tomahawk work — were explicitly banking on that reconciliation money. Breaking Defense noted the production plans still have to clear a final hurdle: funding, and that hurdle just got higher.
What Allied Industrial Planning Looks Like When It's Actually Coherent
For contrast, look at what the Netherlands just put on paper. The Dutch government presented an industrial plan targeting 40% growth in its defense technological and industrial base by 2030, with revenue reaching roughly €15 billion, backed by €1.6 billion in earmarked government funding. The plan names its priorities specifically — integrated air and missile defense, autonomous systems, military sustainment — and breaks the money into discrete buckets: €600 million for industrial ecosystems and scaling production, €320 million for international cooperation, €150 million for supply-chain resilience. It even sets a 2027 procurement change that weighs the national origin of suppliers and components.
I'm not holding up a €15 billion national plan as directly comparable to a trillion-dollar U.S. defense budget. But the contrast in legibility is instructive. The Dutch plan ties dollars to named capability areas and sets dated milestones. The American system, per the GAO, can't yet reliably reconcile its own inventory data across 37 sources. A dual-use lending office dropped into that environment inherits the same legibility problem every other capital tool in the department currently has.
What to Watch
The actual test of whether the Pentagon can get fresh capital to startups building dual-use hardware isn't going to be a press release about a new loan office. It's going to be whether Congress can pass any defense appropriation — reconciliation or otherwise — before House control changes hands in January, and whether GAO's recommended "overarching plan" for munitions production gets an owner with real authority rather than another working group. Watch the next NDAA markup for whether lawmakers attach actual accountability language to the Munitions Readiness Initiative. And watch whether more primes follow Raytheon's lead in using second-sourcing deals, like the one with Ursa Major and Avio, to pull startups into production at scale — because for now, that's where the real capital is moving, appropriations fight or not.
